How about some actual discussion on that referendum amendment, eh?

Between the recent events regarding the forum and yesterday’s grid attack, the core issue that started all this – the proposed constitutional amendment – has been sidetracked. As one of the people who originally suggested this sort of amendment, I would like to restart this discussion… although I’ll have said all I care to say after this post, aside from any clarifications I may be asked to make. To those who don’t read posts longer than your hand – tough. Some thoughts can’t be abstracted to an easy-reading Reader’s Digest Condensed version.

The primary purpose of the amendment is to make further amendments much more difficult to pass. The rebirth of Neualtenburg as a private sim required much reworking of obsolete portions, and the original constitution was not the most consistent document; a stated purpose of this RA term was to rework it into a functional and functioning whole we could live by, as opposed to the great number of informal understandings that have been the norm on the project. This amendment would ensure that further amendments would have to jump through a hoop even greater than they had to at present, to encourage greater development of “ordinary law”. The use of a citizen’s referendum and a limit to the number of referendums was merely a larger stumbling block.

Recent events have convinced me this serves a second purpose. I have long considered Neualtenburg a place where we have fewer illusions than much of the grid. This sounds odd, if you listen to the nay-sayers, but I think the logic bears out. Second Life is not “the 51st US state”, but it certainly is a collection of people. In the modern world, some form of a democratic government has shown itself to be the most consistently stable for the management of any given group of people, even those not commonly thought of as governments – as despotism is only as stable as the despot. This holds true even in the world of business, as family-owned business seldom last past three generations, but a corporation with publicly held stock, with a board of directors elected by the stockholders, can easily last a longer time. In a sense, the Neualtenburg Project is much closer to this second case than a “government” – our aim is not profit, but the common “housing co-operative” analogy is a very close fit.

In either case Neualtenburg must remain accountable to its stakeholders – the citizens. As great pains have been taken to point out, this is not really true under the current structure, despite many of us joining the Project because we have been told that this IS true. Under the current scheme, the Scientific Council may veto any motion of the citizen’s direct representatives on a whim – even the absurdity of an “unconstitutional constitutional amendment”, given that all amendments start as unconstitutional by definition. Despite claims otherwise, this is a greater power that possessed by the Supreme Court of the United States of America.

The oft-quoted “remedy” of impeachment is absurd – on par with the ancient codes of law that cut off limbs for minor first offenses and condemn to death for everything else. We do not have a surplus of willing and able people to run Neualtenburg; we cannot turn every conflict into a destruction test. So is the suggestion that the SC’s term be limited – as a truly abusive SC can veto that law as easily as any other.

This is the reason for the referendum amendment. Aside from simply abandoning the Project and starting fresh, only now do we have a reasonable chance of having it stick, since members of the current SC have expressed support for it. This removes the final power of law from a self-selected meritocracy and places it where it belongs - the stakeholders – the CITIZENS. This presents them a choice beyond “do what the SC will allow, or leave”; they can attempt to convince their fellow citizens that something really does need to be done a certain way. It is not easy; it is not supposed to be easy. The requirements for a referendum to be issued, let alone be passed, are so steep I anticipate nothing that does not have the support of the bulk of the citizenry to ever be made law. But once something is made law, no small unelected group shall stand in its way out of fear that the citizens might “make the wrong choice”, an utterly absurd statement in any society that claims to be democratic in any portion. This is why I support this amendment.

I may be wrong. This may not be desired, or desirable. Yet, I joined Neualtenburg because of the explicit promise that it was not like other private sims; here, you were not a renter leasing from a landlord but an equal partner in a co-operative. It is the only advantage Neualtenburg has over other projects, and considering our slow rate of growth, perhaps not a very good one… but it’s the one that keeps me here. If this promise was false, I have no reason to stay. Without that final reliance – in a project where the very founders are espousing a “Mommy Knows Best” attitude – Neualtenburg is simply a not-very-successful private sim rental outfit, no different from any other except we have a kind of pretty city build that takes up space. This amendment is not the only solution, but if one of those solutions is not taken, then the entire Project is built on a lie, and that's the sort of thing I take personal offense at.

One may wonder if I’m making an illegal ultimatum here. I don’t believe I am, since (as explained in my earlier posting) I'm not threatening to leave in the least... I'm just refusing to acknowledge the authority of anyone who isn't Sudane or a duly-appointed sim manager. If we're really controlled by an unelected group, I'm going with the ones Linden Lab will listen to.

Also, if this post magically disappears, it will soon thereafter appear on the Wiki, and I shall include a link to it in my signature.

I'd like to think some discussion is ongoing. Following up on Gwyn's impeachment theory I've offered what could be seen as a substitute which codifies the RA's right to:

1) Impeach multiple SC members simultaneously

2) Have those impeachments treated as a block.

It's in the very long thread somewhere.

I'd personal prefer something more populist, but there seems to be both broad and deep fear of letting the people vote on policy items. I know not why.

I've followed these discussions with great interest. As you will know, I am not a citizen of Neualtenberg. One of the reasons I've been so interested, however, is that I'm deciding whether to approach the city with an eye to joining it. Though I am an objective observer, I am not a disinterested one.

It strikes me that the philosophical decision underlying the political one is whether the residents can be trusted to govern themselves. I will confess to having an opinion in that regard, since my particular political tradition includes "...Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed...." If I were to vote on the topic, I'd vote for a system that restricted the Scientific Council to strict interpretation of the Constitution's meaning, and leave revisions to it solely in the province of the populace.

I suppose that's my way of suggesting that if you can't trust the people to maintain a just government, then a) you probably couldn't have trusted them to establish one in the first place, and b) no government will be able to overcome whatever it is that makes its people unsuitable to govern themselves.

As noted, I'm not a citizen, and I hope I'm not speaking out of turn.

Aliasi, congratulations on your excellent post — I definitely can't say much more than admitting I was almost convinced But in any case, I definitely agree that we have side-tracked the issue, so let's get back to the original subject...

For the record, I think that the issue is simply put like this: should constitutional amendments that violate the citizens' rights be allowed to pass or not? The current mechanism we have relies on the SC's interpretation of what citizens' rights are or not; a lunatic SC can abuse that interpretation by declaring everything to be against citizens' rights and thus effectively blocking any amendments it doesn't like. Since the only way to bring a SC back to reason is to "exploiting the loophole" of evicting all the members of the SC at the same time, we need something else.

I won't push this suggestion, because firstly, it's an unpopular one, and I also think that loopholes should be patched, and not exploited. It's just because it's so tempting to use it to fix the current dilemma that I like it...

So, for the sake of argument, let's assume that a referendum as originally proposed by Claude is put into effect (I suggested a few restrictions to it: no more than one per term or six months, whatever is shorter; a stronger majority of citizens to have it pass). Philosophically, this means that we're trusting the citizens to recognize when their rights are going to be violated (remember, the SC veto is only valid in the case that the proposed amendments will violate the founding documents, namely, the bill of rights or the constitution itself — the SC cannot veto in any other case), and asking them for input: "Citizens, are your rights being violated or not? The SC says they are; we think they aren't; the choice is your".

So, the proposed referendum will only go into effect in a very special case:
- the bill has to be a Constitutional amendment
- it has to has to be vetoed by the SC on the grounds that it violates citizens' rights (either embodied in the constitution itself or on the founding documents)
- the RA will have to agree on the referendum (it should not be hard to do, since they had agreed on the bill before)

So far — and in the short term — this sounds great, and I'm sure that there is a majority of people (even at the SC) willing to allow that amendment to pass.

But then comes the next step: because the SC has now no effective veto power, the next amendment could remove its veto on RA bills. After all, a charismatic leader will certainly be able to reduce the power of the SC to a point it doesn't have an effective veto anymore.

The next step in this downward spiral would be a reinterpretation on the purpose of the SC: not to act as a "Supreme Court", but just an "advisory body". At this point, the "SC veto" is not more than a parody.

And if something is a parody and not a tool, it makes no sense to have it listed in the Constitution at all. So, one final amendment, always led by a charismatic leader, would completely remove that veto (it would be very simple to explain the citizens why "a parody" should not be allowed to remain in the constitution, and have them vote favorably on a referendum) — and from now on, the RA would be able to modify all laws and all founding documents without any restriction.

Since without a veto, the referendum would not be necessary, it's pointless to consider that the citizens are a "fourth power". By now, the referendum would only be called on unimportant issues — never on the ones that would threaten the RA.

Nothing would prevent the RA to be "forced" to set a fixed date for the next term; they would be able to renew their terms perpetually. Also, even if a rabid SC member would point this out and protest, the "loophole" that allows the immediate removal of that SC member is still there.

You just need to pass the current proposed change to a referendum to be able to set this all in motion. And at all steps there is citizen's validation of the process; it's totally legal and democratic.

The end result, however, is an unbounded RA that can pretty much do what they wish. This extreme example is actually not so extreme — this happened in many RL countries that went the route from a democratic republic into a benevolent (or not-so-benevolent) dictatorship. With citizens validating the legality of the process at all steps — until it was too late to turn back.

The argument right now is that at this juncture it's the SC that can act "tyrannical" by disallowing the RA to pass any laws. Well, the SC cannot create legislation. It cannot dissolve the RA and pass new laws. It cannot easily impeach members of the RA; and even if these were impeached, on a new term, they would get elected again. Effectively, the SC can limit the way the RA works, but it cannot do so indefenitely. It can prevent the normal flow of government — by vetoing all bills and amendments with false claims — but it can also be impeached easily. The key point here is that the SC cannot change the rules — it can only prevent the rules to be changed, which is totally different.

An "unbounded" RA, since it has legislative power, can, however, change all rules. And since the "citizens" are only called to vote when the RA wishes, they have no real power. This is, for me, a much more dangerous position, since the SC would be effectively prevented to protect the citizen's right to a representative democracy, and would be of no help in this situation.

All that is needed for this to happen is:
a) remove the SC's veto on constitutional amendments and put it in the hand of citizens
b) amend the constitution by calling the citizens' referendum just once to totally remove the SC's veto

The argument that "oh, but it won't be done under the current RA, so this example is too extreme" is the same one that currently is defended by the SC: "oh, we won't stop the RA to legislate and amend the constitution, that is too extreme".

As a former member of the RA that tried to approve a bill to effectively remove the financial control of the Guild and put it in the hands of the RA (we tried that, yes ), which was obviously veto'ed on constitutional grounds, I've learned to appreciate why it's important to have the RA safely bounded. At that time, if the citizens were consulted in a referendum, I would feel that they would gladly have overruled the SC's veto — they were mostly agreeable to the RA's suggestions. The RA at that time was not really trying to gather too much power; it just felt that a new "organ" had to be created to organise the finances better — but the SC dutifully reminded the RA that the finances are the prerrogative of the Guild. Had this bill passed, the Guild would be delegated to a "second-class" branch of Government — one that had just the role of building pretty houses. Which is clearly not the intended role of the Guild, as defined by the Constitution!

So my question remains. I don't want to discuss what "unconstitutional constitutional amendments" are, or if we have nice loopholes or not. What seems important to me is how the balance of power is guaranteed. Not for the current term — where we tend to agree most of the time, and there is hardly a decision made without unanimity. But for future terms. Imagine that Anshe Chung (or Plastic Duck, for that matter...) becomes a citizen of Neualtenburg and gets elected to the RA, and is unbounded by anything the SC might say. What do you think she would do, if she knew that she does only need one referendum to pass to give her ultimate power? [for this example to work, of course, Anshe would need an alt ]

By effectively delegating the SC to advisory status — which I won't comment; if it's the citizen's will, I'll be happy to oblige — there is a need to create a new mechanism that effectively prevents an unbounded RA to violate the Constitution or the founding documents (namely, the bill of rights).

So, the proposed amendment under discussion needs to introduce that mechanism. As said, I'm willing to accept the SC delegated to the status of an "advisory board" — since, besides Dianne, I'm the only other citizen of Neualtenburg that distrusts utopian direct democracy (as I always say, it only works in Switzerland, and there are good reasons for that). I have to agree that both Dianne and I might be wrong and all the rest of the citizens are right. In that case, sure, go ahead and reduce the SC to "advisory status". But you'll have to provide a clear mechanism by which the constitution and the founding documents are enforced to protect citizen's rights, and that the RA does not passes bills contrary to the Constitution or the founding documents.

Perhaps the only suggestion that I can make at this point is to bring the third branch into play. If the SC vetoes a constitutional amendment, the Guild may call a referendum to override that veto — and not the RA. This would at least ease my conscience a bit. It would also mean that the RA would have to have full support of the Guild when violating the Constitution and/or the founding documents. It's not perfect, but at least it makes things more difficult, and I think that's the point here: violating citizen's rights should not be done easily.

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To Hans: you're more than welcome to join the discussion; after all, the latest posts have been lead by a non-citizen as well, who was very willing to provide and offer all sorts of opinions on what the government of Neualtenburg should or should not do. To my experience, the first step of non-citizens to finally buy one of the micro-plots for a handful of L$ per month (the only "legal requirement" to become a citizen...) is exactly when they feel their opinion counts — either here in these forums, or even in-world, while they attend some of our meetings

Aliasi, congratulations on your excellent post — I definitely can't say much more than admitting I was almost convinced But in any case, I definitely agree that we have side-tracked the issue, so let's get back to the original subject...

For the record, I think that the issue is simply put like this: should constitutional amendments that violate the citizens' rights be allowed to pass or not? The current mechanism we have relies on the SC's interpretation of what citizens' rights are or not; a lunatic SC can abuse that interpretation by declaring everything to be against citizens' rights and thus effectively blocking any amendments it doesn't like. Since the only way to bring a SC back to reason is to "exploiting the loophole" of evicting all the members of the SC at the same time, we need something else.

I won't push this suggestion, because firstly, it's an unpopular one, and I also think that loopholes should be patched, and not exploited. It's just because it's so tempting to use it to fix the current dilemma that I like it...

So, for the sake of argument, let's assume that a referendum as originally proposed by Claude is put into effect (I suggested a few restrictions to it: no more than one per term or six months, whatever is shorter; a stronger majority of citizens to have it pass). Philosophically, this means that we're trusting the citizens to recognize when their rights are going to be violated (remember, the SC veto is only valid in the case that the proposed amendments will violate the founding documents, namely, the bill of rights or the constitution itself — the SC cannot veto in any other case), and asking them for input: "Citizens, are your rights being violated or not? The SC says they are; we think they aren't; the choice is your".

So, the proposed referendum will only go into effect in a very special case:
- the bill has to be a Constitutional amendment
- it has to has to be vetoed by the SC on the grounds that it violates citizens' rights (either embodied in the constitution itself or on the founding documents)
- the RA will have to agree on the referendum (it should not be hard to do, since they had agreed on the bill before)

So far — and in the short term — this sounds great, and I'm sure that there is a majority of people (even at the SC) willing to allow that amendment to pass.

But then comes the next step: because the SC has now no effective veto power, the next amendment could remove its veto on RA bills. After all, a charismatic leader will certainly be able to reduce the power of the SC to a point it doesn't have an effective veto anymore.

The next step in this downward spiral would be a reinterpretation on the purpose of the SC: not to act as a "Supreme Court", but just an "advisory body". At this point, the "SC veto" is not more than a parody.

And if something is a parody and not a tool, it makes no sense to have it listed in the Constitution at all. So, one final amendment, always led by a charismatic leader, would completely remove that veto (it would be very simple to explain the citizens why "a parody" should not be allowed to remain in the constitution, and have them vote favorably on a referendum) — and from now on, the RA would be able to modify all laws and all founding documents without any restriction.

Since without a veto, the referendum would not be necessary, it's pointless to consider that the citizens are a "fourth power". By now, the referendum would only be called on unimportant issues — never on the ones that would threaten the RA.

Nothing would prevent the RA to be "forced" to set a fixed date for the next term; they would be able to renew their terms perpetually. Also, even if a rabid SC member would point this out and protest, the "loophole" that allows the immediate removal of that SC member is still there.

You just need to pass the current proposed change to a referendum to be able to set this all in motion. And at all steps there is citizen's validation of the process; it's totally legal and democratic.

The end result, however, is an unbounded RA that can pretty much do what they wish. This extreme example is actually not so extreme — this happened in many RL countries that went the route from a democratic republic into a benevolent (or not-so-benevolent) dictatorship. With citizens validating the legality of the process at all steps — until it was too late to turn back.

The argument right now is that at this juncture it's the SC that can act "tyrannical" by disallowing the RA to pass any laws. Well, the SC cannot create legislation. It cannot dissolve the RA and pass new laws. It cannot easily impeach members of the RA; and even if these were impeached, on a new term, they would get elected again. Effectively, the SC can limit the way the RA works, but it cannot do so indefenitely. It can prevent the normal flow of government — by vetoing all bills and amendments with false claims — but it can also be impeached easily. The key point here is that the SC cannot change the rules — it can only prevent the rules to be changed, which is totally different.

An "unbounded" RA, since it has legislative power, can, however, change all rules. And since the "citizens" are only called to vote when the RA wishes, they have no real power. This is, for me, a much more dangerous position, since the SC would be effectively prevented to protect the citizen's right to a representative democracy, and would be of no help in this situation.

All that is needed for this to happen is:
a) remove the SC's veto on constitutional amendments and put it in the hand of citizens
b) amend the constitution by calling the citizens' referendum just once to totally remove the SC's veto

The argument that "oh, but it won't be done under the current RA, so this example is too extreme" is the same one that currently is defended by the SC: "oh, we won't stop the RA to legislate and amend the constitution, that is too extreme".

As a former member of the RA that tried to approve a bill to effectively remove the financial control of the Guild and put it in the hands of the RA (we tried that, yes ), which was obviously veto'ed on constitutional grounds, I've learned to appreciate why it's important to have the RA safely bounded. At that time, if the citizens were consulted in a referendum, I would feel that they would gladly have overruled the SC's veto — they were mostly agreeable to the RA's suggestions. The RA at that time was not really trying to gather too much power; it just felt that a new "organ" had to be created to organise the finances better — but the SC dutifully reminded the RA that the finances are the prerrogative of the Guild. Had this bill passed, the Guild would be delegated to a "second-class" branch of Government — one that had just the role of building pretty houses. Which is clearly not the intended role of the Guild, as defined by the Constitution!

So my question remains. I don't want to discuss what "unconstitutional constitutional amendments" are, or if we have nice loopholes or not. What seems important to me is how the balance of power is guaranteed. Not for the current term — where we tend to agree most of the time, and there is hardly a decision made without unanimity. But for future terms. Imagine that Anshe Chung (or Plastic Duck, for that matter...) becomes a citizen of Neualtenburg and gets elected to the RA, and is unbounded by anything the SC might say. What do you think she would do, if she knew that she does only need one referendum to pass to give her ultimate power? [for this example to work, of course, Anshe would need an alt ]

By effectively delegating the SC to advisory status — which I won't comment; if it's the citizen's will, I'll be happy to oblige — there is a need to create a new mechanism that effectively prevents an unbounded RA to violate the Constitution or the founding documents (namely, the bill of rights).

So, the proposed amendment under discussion needs to introduce that mechanism. As said, I'm willing to accept the SC delegated to the status of an "advisory board" — since, besides Dianne, I'm the only other citizen of Neualtenburg that distrusts utopian direct democracy (as I always say, it only works in Switzerland, and there are good reasons for that). I have to agree that both Dianne and I might be wrong and all the rest of the citizens are right. In that case, sure, go ahead and reduce the SC to "advisory status". But you'll have to provide a clear mechanism by which the constitution and the founding documents are enforced to protect citizen's rights, and that the RA does not passes bills contrary to the Constitution or the founding documents.

Perhaps the only suggestion that I can make at this point is to bring the third branch into play. If the SC vetoes a constitutional amendment, the Guild may call a referendum to override that veto — and not the RA. This would at least ease my conscience a bit. It would also mean that the RA would have to have full support of the Guild when violating the Constitution and/or the founding documents. It's not perfect, but at least it makes things more difficult, and I think that's the point here: violating citizen's rights should not be done easily.

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To Hans: you're more than welcome to join the discussion; after all, the latest posts have been led by a non-citizen as well, who was very willing to provide and offer all sorts of opinions on what the government of Neualtenburg should or should not do. To my experience, the first step of non-citizens to finally buy one of the micro-plots for a handful of L$ per month (the only "legal requirement" to become a citizen...) is exactly when they feel their opinion counts — either here in these forums, or even in-world, while they attend some of our meetings

Proposing a referendum could be seen to have two purposes, the first was just expressed quite eloquently by Hans so I won't repeat it here. The second is as a check on the SC. Gwyn has proposed an interpretation of the impeachment language that can serve the second function.

I want to acknowledge the concerns that some hae expressed about the referendum, but I believe those who oppose it are perhaps more concerned about the rise of an initiative system. Since we don't have other virtual government examples to go by, we must fall back to the real world.

The initiative is a process where a proposal, by gaining a certain number of petition signatures in support, can be placed on a ballot. If approved, that initiative becomes law outside of the normal legislative process. Real world initiatives have led to a number of , IMO, bad laws, including artificial tax caps and alterations to constitutions specifically designed to restrict the rights of minority groups.

However, if the citizens can only act on proposals that have cleared the legislative process, a check is placed on the rampant creation of laws.

Opponents of the proposals being dicussed have made the argument that four members of the RA could do whatever they wanted. However, the referendum would require that these four members of the RA gain the agreement of perhaps as many as 20 citizens (based on the current population) depending on the exact mechanics of the structure. One would have to manipulate or fool quite a few people. I think enough of the citizenry that I believe that would be hard.

I think Gwyn and Diderot's suggestions (pls. correct if I'm mischaracterizing) of having a referendum only if the amendment is vetoed by the SC actually makes further amendments easier for the RA to pass.

If we are to have referenda only after SC vetoes, the current sytem of the RA making amendments and the SC approving/vetoing them is preserved, only adding a method for the RA to go around an SC veto.

That's the bit I don't like, FR: "a way for the RA to go around an SC veto". The RA should never "go around" an SC veto (or a Guild veto, for that matter, on financial issues).

The suggestion that was made is that it's the PEOPLE that "go around an SC veto". Philosophically, I find that more acceptable — if it's the people's wish for desperate measures, let them have them. In this case, to make double-sure that it's not the *RA* "calling for the people", I suggest that it's the Guild doing the honours.

That way, RA and Guild can agree on a way to pass something against the SC's veto (remember: this will be something unconstitutional and/or against citizen's rights, or else there wouldn't be a veto) by having the Guild call for a referendum. Or, the SC might plead with the Guild to keep the RA in check until they behave

The new motto of the SC will henceforward not be "To Serve and Protect" but simply "To Serve and Advise" — citizens will decide if they need the protection...

Flyingroc raises an interesting point. One of the other goals of this process was to make constitutional change more difficult. Is that mutually exclusive with balancing the branches? I can't figure out how to do both.

I'm sure you've already noticed that discussion in these forums can sometimes get heated , so you do have to be a little thick skinned, but I believe input from non-citizens can be valuable, and should be heard.

Attempt 1

Imagine this process.

1) RA approves amendment by 2/3
2) SC vetos
3) Guild approves referendum. NOTE C members may not vote in this processeven if they resign from SC or take a leave of absence between the veto and guild consideration of the referendum
4) referendum occurs in conjunction with next RA election, Requires 50%+1 voter turnout and 50%+1 of votes cast to be for the amendment in order for the veto to be overridden.


What it does;

1) Involves the Guild
2) Checks the RA,
a) By requiring the Guild to approve the referendum, it makes RA power grabs at the expense of the SC harder, since the Guild must now go along.
b) by tying the referendum to the RA election schedule, a given RA could not benefit from a veto override, Only their successors would.

What it doesn't do:

Slow down the amendment process. 2/3 of the RA and a majority of the SC can still work together to amend at a fast and furious rate.

Thus leading to Attempt 2

Imagine this process.

1) RA approves amendment by 2/3
2) Goes to referendum at next RA election. Approval requires 50%+1 yes votes - no minimum turnout

IF SC approves - you have an amendment
If SC vetos:

3) New RA must approve by 2/3
4)Guild must approve referendum NOTE C members may not vote in this processeven if they resign from SC or take a leave of absence between the veto and guild consideration of the referendum
5)Second referendum (same time as next RA election) Override requires 50%+1 voter turnout and 66%+1 of votes cast to be in favor of the amendment.

This certainly makes the process harder. In order for an SC amendment veto to be overridden, the amendment must be approved by:

a 2 different RA's by 2/3 majority.
b The Guild
c, Two referenda six months apart.

Please discuss.

Like Hans I've followed this discussion with a great deal of interest. I'm a non-citizen with an interest in seeing Neualtenburg develop and a potential future citizen. I've been wary of posting in this discussion so far because I wanted to be sure I understood the debate and the content of N'burg's founding documents. Apologies in advance, this is a long post!

I think Gwyn has summarised my misgivings about the original constitutional amendment. Thinking it through, what's the worst that could happen in both scenarios? If the constitution remains as it is now, an obstructive SC could block all the constitutional amendments put forward by the RA, even if they had the support of the majority of the populace. As amended, the RA would be able, through the process Gwyn has outlined, to dominate the three branches and undermine the checks and balances the constitution provides. Given the choice between potential deadlock and potential tyranny (the tyranny of the majority) I'd prefer the former!

The debate has moved on though and Claude has put forward a number of potential compromises based on the involvement of the Guild and the use of referenda. So far the use of referenda has not been discussed as thoroughly as the SCs veto powers. I think that N'burg has to decide whether it is a representative or a direct democracy. If N'burg is to decide weighty constitutional issues by referenda, why stop there? Why not put all bills to a popular vote and do away with the Guild and SC altogether? I think the introduction of referenda into a system of finely-balanced seperation of powers would undermine the existing institutions. Referenda are a fairly blunt tool for deciding public policy, the populace are essentially given the choice to approve or deny a proposal. The process of debate and amendment made possible by representative democracy is far more difficult to achieve through referenda. I think direct democracy can work now, for the size that N'burg is at the moment. You could gather all the citizens in the Marketplace (perhaps call it the Forum?) and debate issues once a week. The problem comes with expansion, direct democracy is not scalable in the way that representative democracy is.

I'll need a little time to mull over Claude's suggestions in the previous post but I have to wonder what the motivation is. In all cases the power of the SC to defend the constitution (the *only* power the SC possesses) is to be removed or bypassed by some route. The fact that the proposed methods are democratic and legal does not alter the fact that this is what the proposals amount to. Now when I first read the N'burg Constitution some months ago I choked on this sentence: "The Scientific Council (SC) is a self-selected meritocracy." It sounds like an affront in an alleged democracy! After reading the discussion to date I've come to the conclusion that the SC is a necessary bulwark against an 'elective dictatorship', the potential abuse of power by the majority.

Thanks, Patroklus.

First, the proposal I just put forward is the result of the input of a number of peope, so I don't know if it's entirely fair to call it "mine".

Second. Gwyn has pointed out how the impeachment provisions could be used to control an "unruly" SC. However, there is also a significant group who would like the constitution to be harder to modify. At the moment, the RA and SC, if they're in agreement can make changes by the bunch. Witness this term as an example. A numbr of people would like to see this situation change to a degree. To this point, No one's suggested a way other than the referendum to slow the process down.

The biggest issue is the power of the SC to veto amendments to the constitution. In a representative democracy the courts don't have any power over the amendment process.

Another issue is the SC's power to veto impeachments. In a representative democracy the courts don't have any power over the impeachment process.

You've answered your own question then. Neualtenburg is a Democratic Republic. Not merely a mob-rule Representative Democracy.

Main Entry: representative democracy
Part of Speech: noun
Definition: a type of democracy in which the citizens delegate authority to elected representatives


Main Entry: democratic republic
Part of Speech: noun
Definition: a form of government embodying democratic principles and where a monarch is not the head of state
Example: What is the Capital of Democratic Republic of Congo?
Usage: politics


Tell me more. Which one is the USA?

Uhm --Neualtenburg isn't the USA, champ. And I don't know where you got your definition but it's incorrect.

Another definition (from our friends at Merriam-Webster) of republic is :



Kendra, what's the difference between this and representative democracy, since you seem to contrast the two?

I got it from Dictionary.com

So, is N'burg trying to replicate the Democratic Republic of Kongo?

Not all three branches of the Neualtenburg Government are representative branches of elected officials.

Easy .

The courts in the USA aren't elected either.

Kevn. I have decided to not argue with you. It's pointless.

Which is why The USA is a Republic and not a Democracy. sheeeesh

Call it what you will. It's a representative democracy or a democratic republic.. who cares, a rose by any name is still a rose.

Why argue terms? My point is the same. The SC shouldn't have any say in amendments or impeachments if it wants to have equal power with the other 2 branches. Otherwise it is all controlling.

You know very little about Neualtenburg if you don't realize the most powerful Governmental Branch is The Artist's Guild.