Keep the SC's veto!

This is cut out of the referendum thread as I think it's a seperate issue and I would like to hear what people think about it.I cut off the bottom bit about the referendum because I want to talk about this top bit which is the reasoning behind it all.

I would say that I don't like the (to me, American) idea of having referendums all the time although Gwyn's framing of this particular implementation seems very carefully done. I find the idea of us all being ruled by referenda as kind of debasing and I hope we never see more than one or two in our entire history here, but that's beside the point.

The problem I have with this is again, that it seems to be an attempt to fix something that is not actually broken. I have said this a few times now I know, but just because there is an apparent short-term, percieved need to pass tons of legislation in a hurry and change the constitution all around (by next week if possible ), doesn't mean we should bend over backwards to do so. Constitutional change is a glacial process in RL, and although I would certainly like to see things procede faster than that, I do feel we are rushing ahead with changes that are not really necessary.

In this case, I don't believe the fact that the SC can veto a bill that is "unconstitutional," necessarily equates to the idea that this makes them "an active participant of the legislative processes." If the SC is sitting as the judicial branch of government (liken to a Supreme Court), then this is precisely the kind of determination they should be making, and the exact role that they should take in the legislative process. It is one of the essential "checks and balances" that work against the ability of the RA (currently four people as Gwyn points out), to radically remake Neualtenburgs government.

Currently, the SC rules on "constitutionality" by comparing the bill to our "founding documents." These currently include:

- The Linden TOS
- The Nburg TOS
- The Nburg Constitution
- California Law
- The United Nations Bill of Rights

By changing the constitution to take away the SC's veto, isn't it like saying that instead of taking a new law "to the experts" (to see if it's legal), we are just going to ask for a show of hands? It seems to me that all kinds of horrendous legislation could be possible under this new regime.

Hypothetically, suppose the RA were to pass a law that all conversations in the city were to be monitored (let's say we are worried about "spies" or something). The SC, if it did it's job, would point out that this bill violates several of our founding documents and strike down the law. On the other hand, if the SC were not around to do that, popular support for "monitoring" could easily be drummed up by a well-liked RA and the measure could easily pass by referendum.

If this reminds you of the work of people like Tony Blair and George Bush to try to remove the checks and balances to their authority and attempts to circumvent the law of the land for "expediency," it definitely was intended to. This is the exact way in which gay people were finally given the right to marry in most countries today, because the laws that were popular were deemed to be illegal by the supreme courts of those countries, based on an analysis of the contitution and bill of rights. This is a good thing.

Ruling on constitutionality is the proper function of the judicial branch of any government and should not be removed. If a proposed law is "illegal" by our constitution and our bill of rights, then it is illegal, period. The veto exists because if a bill put before the SC is worded such as to violate the constitution then it simply is wrong. It's not that the SC is saying "they don't like it" or "they don't agree with it." They are saying it is simply illegal to procede that way based on past precedent and law. The point of Pens question to Flying Roc was that regardless of what an individual SC member "feels" or "likes" they should decide based on the letter of the law only.

The astute in the crowd may notice that in the (dim) past that I have argued against this veto by the SC, so I guess that deserves an explanation.

What I thought was bad at that time (and still do to a degree), is not so much that the veto exists, but that the veto exists in an environment where there is no clear process for the selection of members to sit on the SC, no clear method of "unsitting" a member of the SC, no defined term for a member of the SC, no minimum number or members of the SC, and all the other various "glitches" I saw in the system at the time.

I would like to see reform of the Scientific Council as I think most of the sitting members currently do as well, but reform in the sense of defining the things above, not in simply removing all its powers at a stroke, and putting the reins of government and the determiination of things like human rights in the hands of a populist referendum.

I think the veto should stay, but (again like the supreme court), a written statement should be made as to why the law in question violates precedent or constitutionality. The decisions can be analytical, open and transparent. Perhaps even published on the web for all to see, with dissenting opinions (if any) by dissenting members of the SC.

It is absolutely necessary for the SC to have a veto. period. end of discussion.

The current constitution gives the SC the power to veto 2 different things: bills, and constitutional amendments. Let me tackle each one in turn:

With regard to the vetoing of bills, I think the current thinking is *not* that the SC should be removed the power to declare a law unconstitutional, but only that it not be a proactive executive branch style veto.

The RA's fear is that the SC would be too slow in ratifying bills passed by the RA. Gwyn's solution of having SC's inaction as meaning automatic ratification looks to me like a good solution to this problem.

As to whether the veto powers of the SC for bills is removed, I actually find myself rather indifferent. If the veto power is removed, the SC will become more like a traditional judiciary. That is, instead of proactively declaring a bill unconstitutional, the SC will have to wait for a citizen to bring up a case to court before it can rule on its constitutionality.

In your hypothetical situation where the RA passes an egregious unconstitutional bill, the SC can move immediately to strike it down. In a no-veto situation, the SC waits for a citizen to complain about it in court, and then the SC strikes it down.

Actually, if we allow SC members themselves to bring cases to the court, this will result in a de-facto veto power. If not, there is the small possiblity that the SC might think a certain law is not constitutional, but cannot rule on it because nobody brings it to court. I think if that were the case the SC will find some way to convey its opinion.

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A second type of veto power given to the SC is the power to veto *constitutional amendments*. This, I think is what Gwyn was talking about -- replacing the veto on constitutional amendments with a referendum.

I am uncomfortable with the SC having that kind of power. The SC could effectively block *any* change to our foundational documents. (it can be argued that any constitutional amendment could be violating our foundational documents, since the constitution is part of it!)

I believe that the constitution should primarily be a document that defines how the people of Neualtenburg wish to govern themselves. As such, I am in favor of giving the power to change and redefine this document to the people who will live by it.

I think the SC should be able to file briefs/opinions on bills if they so desire, but not veto them. They can rule on constitutionality of bills when a non SC citizen brings a case to court. This way they won't "legislate from the bench". If a judge needs to petition court on his own behalf, he must recuse himself from judging the case. I think they should be able to veto constitutional amendments, just like the supreme court. I'd like to see their name changed to the judicial branch/the supreme court, and focus it on the law.

Maybe we can define the SC as 3, 5 or 7 judges who are nominated for appointment by the LRA and voted on by the people (up or down after a single RA debate). Terms could last 6 months, initially staggered to start 3 months into the RAL's leadership. Maximum 2 consecutive terms. Maybe can be nominated again after skipping a term.

In the event of vacancies causing even numbers of judges, the chief justice will break ties. This allows the judiciary to function at all times. Yes, these jobs should be paid out of the gov't treasury and we should keep the judges busy with meaningful work. When not hearing cases, they should be debating and writing opinions and recording precedent. Some kind of proceedings transcipt should be kept. Give them robes and gavels.

BTW we could really use some good scripting implementation of secret ballots. Just my 2 cents. Also, the consitution needs a mechanism for electing the Guildmaster (GM). A griefing dictator Guildmaster can destroy not just gov't, but the economy and the Sim itself. Of critical importance is succession, whereby all objects created by the guild for the city, or commssioned works by the Guild are transferred from the old GM inventory as copyable and modifyable to the new Guildmaster. N'Burg/Guild can lose huge amounts of IP if that doesn't happen.

I know I sound like an American Republican here, but actually I'm a Canadian Liberal.

I, myself, feel that bills should be veto-able (and a proactive one at that, even) but amendments should not. You can't declare a constitutional amendment unconstitutional without slipping into contradiction, after all. However, amendments should be MUCH harder to pass than they are currently.

As for the "Americanism" of a referandum... it's hardly an exclusively American thing, and I'm the one who said it's a bit funny for a democratic government to be afraid of its own citizens voting on something. Ordinary bills are one thing, but a constitutional amendment is a change to the contract that citizen agreed to when they joined.

Buckle your safety belts this is going to be long

First of all. I don't believe the proposal on the table takes the veto away from the SC. It merely redefines it. Veto, after all, means “I forbid”. The constitution, as it is now written, requires the SC to affirmatively approve each bill passing out of the RA. This is very much contrary to the idea of veto, where some person or group blocks legislation by their action. If what we really mean is a veto, forcing the SC to act to block a bill is entirely appropriate.

Gwyneth's proposal suggests there should be a time limit for the SC to take this action. This is consistent with RL models. Using the ubiquitous American example, a bill passed by Congress on which the president takes no action for ten days (provided Congress remains in session) becomes law without his signature.

Here, just to clarify, is what I think Gwyneth has proposed. The SC can veto bills but not constitutional amendments, which will instead be subject to referendum. In order to veto a bill, the SC must consciously act to do so within a certain number of days of the bills passage by the RA. This differs from the current system which, on paper, requires the SC to, like an upper house, actively approve each passed RA bill whenever it feels like it.

If the current system is retained, the SC becomes the upper house of the legislature. Dianne has argued for this interpretation and design. However, it opens up other issues.

Now, a digression into political philosophy. Locke and even Hobbes argue that governments exist because at some point, individuals give up some of their individual authority and liberty to the government in exchange for something. This model is especially relevant to Second Life. Residents, within the very broad bounds of the LL TOS, can do whatever they'd like. They do not enter the grid as citizens of any SL government, but must very consciously choose to join. Unlike real life, SL residents are just as free to leave any governmental model in which they may participate. Thus, in SL, governments do only exist by the active consent of their citizenry.

Therefore, an SL democracy, which Neualtenburg claims to be, must put the people, or those accountable to them, as the final political authority. Our current system doesn't do that. To see why, let's play, “Who can block or circumvent whom?”

An RA bill can be blocked either by the Guild (if it deals with finance) or the SC. In the former case, there is a provision for the RA to override the veto by a supermajority. In the latter, end of discussion

The Guild can be blocked by the SC or by means of the RA not funding whatever it is the Guild wants to do.

The SC can be blocked by.....nobody (Yes I know there's impeachment. I'll explain why it doesn't qualify in a few paragraphs)

Decisions of the SC are unappealable. In RL governments, you get around this by changing the constitution, sort of as a last resort, if there is widespread agreement that the judiciary decision was wrong. In Neualtenburg, this approach can be stopped dead in its tracks by .....the SC.

“But what about impeachment?”, you ask. Why not throw the SC out if they don't act in accord with popular will? I would reply that impeachment, regardless of how you view its actual uses through history, is not intended as a political tool. Instead, impeachment is available as a tool against those who do something “wrong” (legally). However, if impeachment is the only tool available to deal with an unpopular SC decision, it will be used politically.
So lets review where we are. The SC

1)Can block any other branch of government.
2)Cannot be overridden.
3)Has members who serve forever and are not accountable, either individually or collectively, to the citizenry, for their official actions once seated.

If all three of these conditions remain, we do not have a democracy. We instead have a self -selected oligarchy “in charge”.

Sorry to be so blunt, but the democratic future of Neualtenburg depends on where, constitutionally, the buck stops. Right now that's the SC. It needs to be somewhere else if we mean what we say about democracy.

I agree with everything Claude has to say. I'd like to see RA appointed nominees to SC approved by the people for say a 12 month term. You want the people to be able to approve of an SC nominee, but that the SC is above most factional politics. There must be some kind of accountability to the people. BTW, 12 months is a long time in SL.

Maybe then veto of bills per Gwyneth. For constitutional amendments, what should the amending formula be? We could hold referenda for amendments, but I hope this doesn't bog down the system too much. How about passing an amendment with unanimous RA or 2/3rds referendum supermajority? Growing up in Quebec, I'm not a big fan of 50%+1 referenda on huge constitutional issues.

Let me harp on the Guild once more. The Guild and the RA are almost setup to clash. The actual IP of prims and scripts resides with the Guildmaster (GM). Ok, fine. SC ensures proper GM succession. It would seem to me that the City Prims could be owned by an LRA alt (Land trustee). This stops the GM from ripping down the city in a fit. The treasury account, and deeds, and modifyable/copyable city and Guild contract prims are held by a GM alt (Guild trustee). These alts should be used only by respective owners and all use be recorded and made available publically.

I think the actual source of political power & enforcement in N'burg (NAB) is currently controlled by the undemocratically elected Guild Master (GM). This is in the form of land deeds and the treasury. We know how the GM is elected, but how does one become a master? That's entirely up to the guild as it should be, and can even be secret. Nothing stops one from being GM for life, there are no terms or confidence mechanisms. So the Guild is not a democratic institution per constitutional decree, not accountable to the people and there's no reason it needs to be. Having said that, they should be a mercantile assocation, as they were historically and not hold direct instruments of power. The Guild could hold on to the RA treasury and the land deeds as long as a bill is passed saying that:

a)the Guild cannot spend any treasury monies unapproved as a spending bill (this is in the constitution I think).
b)The guild cannot touch/use privately held deeds or public lands in any way except as the result of instruction by RA (conferring citizenship by purchase, emergency eminent domain, or accepted city contract), or SC (revocation of citizenship sentence deletes the deed).

Of course the Guild can purchase land but this should be deeded to the GM and not exceed consitutional limits (4,096m2) inside NAB. Masters should have their own private workshops.

Actually this keeps the process transparent as long as all transfers of treasury and deed transactions are recorded. The Guild should also have their own money in an account for their own use in the hands of the GM. For example, when the city pays for a Guild object, this should be a payment from the treasury to the Guild account. The Guild can then split the proceeds (pay the artisans) any way they see fit. There should be a monthly reconcilation between RA approved spending and the Guild Trustee's holdings.

The Guild in the past has been upset by lack of payment for its works. So I propose that a non-guild member civil engineer job be appointed by LRA open to citizens, but in the interests of saving money, probably given to RA members who draw a salary. LRA can setup whatever cabinet posts or jobs he/she wants, but civil service overall payroll is a budget line item (separate from RA salaries). BTW those contracts for past public works projects should be public record, and I'm not sure the citizenry has seen them. The citizens should know about the liability of the city for past unpaid public works.

Ok, why? This way, an approved construction/maint. spending bill triggers a bid by the Guild within say 10 days. Guild always has first crack at a (NAB city) contract. If the quote comes in too high, the RA does a general RFP to the outside, at which point the Guild can bid again. Payment is maybe 1/2 up front, 1/2 on acceptance. Acceptance of objects/Sims etc. approved and installed as non-copyable, non-modifyable by the civil engineer. After installtion, the engineer transfers ownership to the Land Trustee.

This way, the Guild can be paid for city work, and the city is not beholden to outrageous Guild price quotes. The guild can continue making objects for sale or its own uses or as volunteer work as it sees fit. There's also no reason, as far as I can see, that the Guild should not be able to manage their own funds and collect dues. Maybe the Land Trustee can take the place of the engineer, I think that would work better. The only problem with that is that the LRA needs to know about building/installation/inspection/quality control and is busy already.

Guilds historically control who enters the merchant class and how commerce is run. The inner workings of the guild should be up to the guild with only the GM voting role, GM election, the GM succession process (retaining city IP) and the right of first city contract refusal defined in the constitution. How the guild selects masters really ought to be up to the guild. You could keep apprenticeship open to all, but restrict marketplatz or store ownership to journeymen or guild members who pass muster. You don't want incompetent merchants in the platz.

I like the way the consitution is written currently where Guild membership is open and free for all apprentices, so that anyone who wants to work in/for the city, be they citizen or not, is able to. The constitution defines membership as free, but is it free as in beer or free as in speech (zero cost or freedom to join or both)?

If I understand correctly, and looking at the political structure, everything was a non-profit collective. Not having guild funds separate from the treasury made it tough to pay artisans. In fact it kind of looked like a commune or communism with the occasional tourist. Not suprisingly, it did not attract much private enterprise and business was stagnant. The tiny sim was a very notable exception, and speaks to your Guild's extrodinary technical talent, market savvy and high art.

Ok, but then how does the city make money from merchants without a commercial income tax? A guild member sets up shop with a business plan/proposal approved by the GM. The Guild takes a percentage (10% negotiable) of all NAB business net income at month end. All merchants *must* be guild members anyway, and this also gives the Guild the monthly balance sheet. At the same time, the business should be in partnership with the NABRA at a fixed rate, say 20% (negotiable but probably should be fixed for all merchants) so that the city gets income (in addition to commercial land fees) from successful businesses. The city (RA) can seize property using eminent domain, and the Guild can revoke the merchant permit. Either branch can pull the plug on the business, keeping in mind that only the RA should be able to revoke citizenship through seizure of land as part of a banishment sentence by the SC.

That said, these are private businesses, the initial business plan is known only to the GM and the detailed balance sheet known only to the GM and LRA. GM vouches for revenue and monthly dividend reported and paid to RA. We want 100% paid employment for all who want jobs. We actually seem to be quite monetarily impoverished compared to some. I see trades of $L100k at the currency exchange, and actually spoke to a very large sim owner who would like to secure $L1M (~$3,700 USD). Way out of our/my league, but Holy Schnikes, if we could take the business lead and get there...

PS: I think commercial partnerships would work, and that RL or SL incorporation is excessively complicated for little tangible benefit. Let's try a little free enterprise experiment. We should strive for full paid employment and also incentivize citizenship. Like, civil servants must be citizens, citizens get merchant discounts and citizens are preferred job candidates.

A big trick is making these various mechanisms work within the SL world without being too complicated/ponderous. So much for KISS. Ok, whaddya think?

Incorrect. The IP of things you make rests with you; if made for the city and you actually sell it to the city, then the City owns it. Also, if you examine the actually ownership of the prims in the city, they belong to quite a few different people. Also, many people are officers in the land-management group, so it's not just the Guildmaster who could tear things down.



Untrue entirely, although I can see how you might think so since we're still in the "constitutional revision" process. The Guildmaster serves a term just like the RA; the main difference is who votes. However, getting more formal structures in the Guild and in how it interfaces with the other branches is a major goal this term.



The Guild isn't, strictly speaking, a guild.

It's actually the most eglitarian of the branches because absolutely anyone can join.

A Guildmaster can be elected out of office by a pluraility of Masters, or can even be impeached by the SC.

It is not up to the RA to determine how the Guild operates, it is up to members of the Guild (of which ANY citizen in Neualtenburg is free to join)

Currently over half the town are Guild members..

It is by far the most egalitarian of all the branches of government.

BTW I'm quite mindful of the fact that I'm not a citizen and that my Guild comments don't belong in this thread. I'm happy to comply with the moderator in both respects if she has an opinion. Ok here goes, and I'm not out to flame here, just to get a better understanding.



Yes, of course, the IP of things we individually make rests with us. And I understand if I sell to the city, that the city owns it, and this is as it should be. Now, is there a "City" or "Land Trustee Avatar"? If so, who is it controlled by? I think it ought to be controlled by the LRA.

The idea of distributing prim ownership in the land-managment group is interesting and worthy, if say each officer owns different things, then no one person could wreck the city. As it stands, if I understand, any single land mgmt officer could go off the deep end and destroy all public works. Correct me here. I think, as a general concept, the city (read RA) must own public/city supported land and the non-copyable non-modifiable prims. If all land mgmt officers own all public prims, then I suppose it wouldn't be too hard to "reinstall" the city if a rogue went nuts and was banished. Is that the idea? Who makes up the land-mgmt team? AC only, no one in the RA I hope, if so, why would the RA/treasury pay for anything twice?

*I fear a Guildmaster or Guild master artisan with huge public work projects built in NB leaving NB without sharing knowledge with the Guild. This danger can't be guarded against if the RA contracts with the outside.*

BTW I'm not saying take away any individual ownership to creations.
What do you think of this IP arrangement?
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1)Per existing constitution, individual artisans retain IP of their work.
2)All public prims are owned by the "City Avatar" controlled by the LRA and are non-modifyable, non-copyable.
3)The GM and Dean each have a IP trustee alt that holds copyable & modifyable prims of all public works. Illegal for the Dean to sell public works directly to the RA.
============================================

I'm saying if we waived a magic wand and turned the LRA into Satan, the guild could quickly rebuild town. If the Guildmaster went nuts, the Dean could give the IP to the new Guildmaster. If the Dean went nuts and was impeached/banished, the GM could rebuild. The GM and Dean would have to go nuts together to lose the IP and the city wouldn't be destroyed. All 3 branch heads would have to go nuts at once to destroy the public works IP and the city. Which works for me. I'm trying to debug this and make it difficult for dictators to run amok.

So that's prims. Try running land ownership and treasury through that same scenario.
Satan in each branch. Then 2 Satan combos, then 3 Satans. It's like a check and balance verification.

Treasury: GM absconds with the loot and is banished. Can't get around that, hmm.

Land: Not sure who really owns land, assume it's the City. LRA sells NB land to Anshe, hmmm. How does land ownership specifically work again? I thought the city owns private land and private residents own the deed. Correct?


Ulrika, bless her, might have left SL without handing over prims etc.
BTW I think statues of the founders should be placed in the city square.



Ok my bad, I should have read sections 2 & 5. So you elect every 6 months and can turf on a 2/3rds master vote. Thanks. Thanks to you too Kendra, and I agree, leave the Guild to the Guild. I'd like to see that right of first refusal for city contracts as a law or amendment. The guild should get first crack at all public projects.



The Guild, strictly speaking is an AC with gov't powers. It doesn't look much like a guild to me. Incidentally, the SC doesn't work to me like a scientific council at all. It's an oligarchic supreme court. But that isn't obvious from the consitution unless you see the how the branches work in practice, as Claude illustrated. These labels confuse newcomers because they have little resemblance to their RL counterparts. RA makes sense to me. Maybe I should use AC and PB, otherwise I get confused. Whatever you do, don't let me teach a civics class.

I replied to this in a new thread.

I think I may have confused things by not separating out constitutional amendments from bills in my comments. I was writing as if a constitutional amendment passed through the RA was pretty much the same thing as a bill.

I would agree that contstitutional amendments are a different thing and in this I agree with Aliasi who pointed out so clearly, (and in so few words! ) that to be able rule on the constitutionality of a constitutional amendment is contradictory. I would say though that as arbitrators of the constitution and based on their (presumed) deep knowledge of it, that the SC should certainly be involved in constitutional amendments because if they were not it's like scripting a project and not talking to your best scripters first.

Aliasi's second point on the constitution is also very important. Amendments to the constitution should not be as easy to make as they currently are. A great deal of the impetus for my original remarks came from my perception that massive changes can be made to our democratic structure by the agreement of a few people who show up at an RA meeting one week. This scares me.

A few comments on Claudes comments:
I agree with this (in terms of bills only), in that I think Gwyns proposal for a time limit is appropriate given that the time limit is long enough. I think however if we regularise the RA meetings to once a week and the SC meetings to once ever two weeks that there is actually no need for this in that no legislation will ever have to languish longer than a week.

I also think it's unecesssary to change the veto in that the positive vs. negative thing is reallly a bit of semantics. Currently, if the SC doesn't (positively) approve a bill it can't be law, so that's the same as a (negative) veto really and that's why people talk about it that way perhaps. Gwyn's proposal of introducing a time frame where the bill becomes law anyway does the "least damage" to the original intent of the setup so if change must be made I am in favour of that, but I have to say (over and over again ), I do not see any reason to change this at all.

If the SC cant find it within themselves to approve of a bill within the (between one hour & one week) period indicated by the modified sitting schedules, it would only be because they are physically unavailble or unable to do so. I think it's an awfull precedent to have a country where bills become law because the server is down or because someones computer is broken or because the SC is all out with the bird flu or something.
I disagree a bit with this interpretation.

I dont personally see the SC as an "upper house" in the sense of the House of Lords in England or say the Senate in Canada. In RL I have petitioned for the abolotion of such extraneous "houses" as I dont see that they serve their original purpose, although my use of the "sober second thought" argument probably sounded like that.

I see the SC more as a Judicial branch liken to the Supreme Court. The main difference between the SC and the American Supreme Court being that instead of waiting for a citizen petition to determine the legality of legislation, they rule on each piece of legislation as it comes up. I think this is an interesting and perhaps helpful difference. How much time is wasted by the adversarial system of legal wrangling in RL, and how much of it could be eliminated if the legislators were not allowed to pass laws that were essentially illegal and then wait for some well heeled citizen with a lot of time and energy to prove them wrong?

I chopped this part up a bit for brevity (and because I am supposed to be working in my RL job right now ), but if you look back in the forum you will see that I made essentially this same argument myself almost word for word.

I hope that people don't see my disagreement with removing the SC's ability to rule on constitutionality of bills as being in opposition to the program of changing the governmental structure to be more accountable and more democratic, because I believe like Claude that this should happen.

The SC as currently formulated has a quality of being an Executive branch of goverment, kind of like an overseeing "elected for life" presidential cabal, and I have never liked that. I don't think it's wrong however to have an unelected branch ruling on constitutionality and law and keeping the "popular" house from running out of control. What the public finds the most appealing is not always the right thing to do, that's one reason why government by referenda is such a bad idea.

I think the way to attack the fact that the SC is perhaps not as accountable as other branches of government (and perhaps this argument might even apply to the Guild), is to work on the structure of those branches, not to just cut them out or hobble them in favour of on overarching RA.

Clearer language and rules on how someone is belived to "merit" being on the SC would be good. I find the concept of a meritocracy interesting and relatively new in terms of other world governments. Rikght now its a sketchy concept, but given time I think it could work out. Term limits are also something to look at, and the fact that the impeachment process for the SC is singularly undefined is also problematic. I just dont feel that "taking away their powers" in favour of the RA is necessarily the way to go.

We all compare our government to RL examples of government, most often this is the US style government, but part of the point of what we are doig here (IMO) is to think about what kind of government we want, not just to copy what the USA or any other RL country does.

I agree.

When I was saying that it was "an American thing," I meant the idea of "governing by referendum" or having a plethora of referendums on every topic under the sun like the citizen inspired propositions that a lot of US states allow. I would hate to see us do that.

Referendums are a good thing, but like Gwyn, I think they should be a rare occasion and mostly for constitutional issues.

It has certainly been interesting to follow the discussion on the proposed revision of the procedure for submission of constitutional amendments as described in Article I, section 6.

According to this the RA may pass a constitutional amendment with 2/3 of the vote being in favour of the proposal. This may in turn be negated by the SC if they deem the amendment to be unconstitutional in relation to the founding documents of Neualtenurg.

As it presently stands the SC is thus the ultimate authority on the question of constitutional revision.

This has been pointed out by some to be potentially problematic as a hypothetical maliciously minded SC may effectively block a constitutional change deemed necessary by the RA if it is in its interest to do so. The initial proposal seems to have sprung from a perception of the need for a (better) safeguard against the abuse of power by the SC.

The argument for an improved mechanism of checks and balances against the SC seems to me to be largely based on the basis that the SC selects its own members on the supposition of merit. The SC lacks the accountability to the people that the RA enjoys as the basis for their legitimacy.

On the other hand there are those who argue that the legitimacy issue is indirectly addressed by giving the RA the power to approve or reject new candidates for the SC and by giving both the RA and the Guild the power to seek the overturning of an individual SC member by initiating impeachment procedures against the person in question.

The constitution does not mention explicitly the requirements for the SC to be able to veto a bill or constitutional amendment so it is assumed that a simple majority vote is sufficient to exercise this power. This means in principle that the opinion of a single member of the SC may be decisive in overturning a proposed constitutional amendment.

It is difficult to surmise from the consitution in its present form what will be the exact consequences in a situation where the RA and the SC both feel strongly enough about the proposed amendment to initiate impeachment hearings against individual members of the other branch in order to seek the promotion of their cause.

The reason for this confusion on my part stems from what seems to be contradictions in the constitution about the procedure for conducting an impeachment hearing:

Article II, section 4 states that the leader of the artisanal branch sits as leader of the Representative branch if the Representative Branch seeks to impeach a member of the Philosophical Branch.

Article III, section 6 states however that all impeachment hearings will be performed in the Philosophic Branch by the chairs and that a member of the branch not calling for the impeachment hearing will serve as leader of the Philosophic branch during the hearing.

These two clauses seem to be in contradiction. Will an impeachment against a member of the SC be decided by a vote of the RA chaired by the Gildemeister or by a vote of the SC chaired by the Gildemeister?

It seems logical to assume that Article III, section 6 only refers to impeachments sough by the Philosophic branch against a member of another branch of government (as the opposite assumption would lead to the Philosophical Branch being chaired either by a member of the branch under accusation or by the leader of the Philosophical Branch, either of which seems contrary to the desire of having the branches place checks and balances on each other) and therefore the proper wording of the section should be "the leader of the branch not seating the member under impeachment proceedings will serve as leader of the Philosophic branch during the hearing." This is in line with the impeachment procedure as described in the case where it is initiated by the other branches of government.

It should be evident from the above that there is a certain inclarity in the present constitution in the description of how to handle impeachment proceedings especially as it pertains to those being initiated by the Philosophic branch.

Perhaps in part it is this inclarity in combination with a concern over the ability of the impeachment instrument to serve as a sufficiently fine-grained and balanced instrument for the RA to ensure the diversity of opinions and merits present among the members of the SC that has lead to a desire among some to propose that the SC not have the power of veto over constitutional amendments.

I understand the concern of granting what amounts to a majority of one single member of the SC the power to veto a constitutional amendment being supported by 2/3 majority of the RA. My understanding is based on the assumption that the impeachment procedure may not be the best instrument for the RA to resort to in seeking redress against the SC in matters of disagreement: It is in my view not entirely clearly described how it works in the constitution and the scenario of the two branches of government seeking to impeach individual members of the other branch on the basis of this unclear foundation because they disagree over the constitutionality of a proposed amendment does not seem feasible in my view. The situation would simply lead to far too much instability for Neualtenburg. Also one should distinguish between procedures for dealing with an impropriety of conduct and procedures for ensuring checks and balances in managing differences of opinion between the branches of government.

I am therefore in favour of seeking an alternative to the impeachment procedure in the solution of disagreements between the RA and SC over the constitutionality of a proposed constitutional amendment.

I understand the concerns advanced by some about using a referendum as an alternative mechanism of granting the RA legitimacy for proposed constitutional amendments. There are two main problems with referendums as I see them: 1) No one is accountable for the outcome of a referendum. The people decide on the issue but the people as an electorate cannot be accountable to itself nor to any branch of government. 2) Constitutional amendments are typically about basic rights and the arrangement of powers in relation to each other. If we let a majority of the people decide on such issues there is a danger that a small majority might impose severe limitations on a substantial minority by way of a constitutional amendment because it is in their self-interest to do so.

Gwyneth's original post outlined a concept where in the worst case a 50%+1 majority of a 50% voting part of the electorate would be enough to pass a constitutional amendment. This amounts to 25% of the electorate being able to impose a new constitution on the remainder of the population. This is potentially problematic in light of the above.

Perhaps a compromise between the positions I have tried to outline could be that the RA is normally able to pass constitutional amendments with a 2/3 majority with the exception of cases where they are overruled by a majority of the SC in which case they will need to have the constitutional amendment approved by a referendum gaining a qualified majority of more than 2/3 of the electorate?

Such a solution would in my view address both the concerns of the impeachment instrument as being inappropriate to counterbalance the veto power of the SC on the one hand and the concern on the other hand of having constitutional amendments being passed by the people without any mechanism in place to address the rights of minorities for example.

Should the electorate decide to pass a constitutional amendment which is in serious violation of the founding documents concerned members of the SC (or of the losing minority) could always appeal to a "supra-governmental body" such as Linden Labs, the California State Judiciary or even the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to have the decision overturned

I apologise if the above seems convoluted or confusing. It is complicated stuff, which can be difficult to express clearly when English is not your mother tongue.

I'm on a clock here so don't even have time to read carefully the recent postings in this thread. It sounds, however, like we all agree on more than we disagree on and differences may be primarily a matter of language rather than intent.