My "impress the ladies" link o' the day

Thanks man. I was looking for something that will help me get a raise!

T

and this impresses the ladies how? just by the laughs it brings forth?

Great find... LOL

I like the take me off your mailing list one.

I actually used Barath Raghavan's Crypto Topic Generator and then sent one of my co-workers an email asking him if he'd read the paper yet (implying that everyone who did anything in cryptography had).

He sent me about 3 emails asking for a copy of the paper, so I sent him a link to the site.




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*impressed*

Rutherford, C., and Garey, M. Homogeneous, distributed theory for systems. In Proceedings of the Conference on "Fuzzy", Robust Algorithms (Mar. 1991).

Papadimitriou, C., Jones, M., Hawking, S., Minsky, M., Maruyama, I., and Tapioca, V. SnuffyNaze: Trainable algorithms. In Proceedings of NSDI (Mar. 1993).

Sadly... the fuzzies actually exist:

Juels and Sudan’s fuzzy vault scheme is an improvement upon the previous work by Juels and Wattenberg. Alice can place a secret value k (e.g., private encryption key) in a vault and lock (secure) it using an unordered set A. Bob, using an unordered set B, can unlock the vault (access k) only if B overlaps with A to a great extent.

The procedure for constructing the fuzzy vault is as follows: First, Alice selects a polynomial p of variable x that encodes k (e.g., by fixing the coefficients of p according to k). She computes the polynomial projections, p (A) , for the elements of A . She adds some randomly generated chaff points that do not lie on p , to arrive at the final point set R.

When Bob tries to learn k (i.e., finding p ), he uses his own unordered set B. If B overlaps with A substantially, he will be able to locate many points in R that lie on p. Using error-correction coding (e.g., Reed-Solomon), it is assumed that he can reconstruct p
(and hence k).

The security of the scheme is based on the infeasibility of the polynomial reconstruction problem (i.e., if Bob does not know many points that lie on p , he can not feasibly find the parameters of p , hence he cannot access k). Note that since this fuzzy vault can work with unordered sets (common in biometric templates, including fingerprint minutiae data), it is a promising candidate for biometric cryptosystems.

Even stranger are the Trainable Randomized Paging Algorithms.

Makes you wonder dosen't it. I am not surprised that a group of students could write an absolute bullshit white paper and have everyone accept it.

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Silly