One request was made to the SC to launch the discussion on the current position held by the SC itself regarding the legislative functions. The original constitution tended to encourage thinking about the SC more as a "judiciary" body (and thus its reason for being mostly independent of the citizen-elected RA) and an advisory body. Tradition, however, "pushed" the SC towards an active participant of the legislative processes, by giving it a constitutionally-sanctioned "veto" on bills approved by the RA, and introducing an often misinterpreted sentence (the "power" to resubmit bills to the RA in case of a veto), that made the SC come much closer to a "bicameral" system, as Justice Soothsayer has suggested.
Now, on one side, every citizen has the "power" to submit (or resubmit) bills, not only the SC. The RA's "power" is to make those bills into law. The RA cannot fail to address submitted bills by any citizen; what it can do is set up proper procedures for bill submission, and, in case these are not followed, reject the bill. A properly-submitted bill, however, has to be addressed by the RA; what they can immediately do is vote "nay" on it and move on to the next item; thus, the suggestion was made that any citizen, wishing to submit a bill, should approach a member of the RA to "support" that bill. This is of course not a requirement, just a way to guarantee that the RA will, indeed, at least discuss the bill.
According to this view, naturally it follows that the sentence "The Philosophic branch may veto or rewrite and resubmit a bill or constitutional amendment if it is in violation of any of the founding documents." (Art. III, Sec. 8; also see Art. I, Sec. 6) is redundant. "Rewriting and resubmitting" a bill is a power given to any citizen, and there is not even a need to "support" that "rewriting and resubmitting" in case of "violation of any of the founding documents".
On the other hand, this very same section applies the SC's vetoing power to both bills and constitutional amendments. There was a reason for that: the original founders were afraid that an enthusiastic RA could change the constitution completely, disrespecting all ideas and principles upon which it was based. Extreme examples would be changing from a representative democracy towards a base democracy; introducing a 4th branch, an executive branch; moving from a three-branch structures without a Head of State towards a "monarchy" or "oligarchy"; change the way the inter-relations between the three branches worked in an unbalanced way, giving more power to some branches and less on others, without proper care. This means that just 5 people, agreeing together on a single day, could change forever the whole way of how Neualtenburg worked. There are no balances on constitutional amendments; they can happen any day, any time, and as soon as 2/3 of the RA agree upon a constitutional amendment, it enters in effect immediately.
To prevent this, it was thought that the SC should "validate" this procedure by tagging a constitutional amendment relatively to its conformity to the "founding documents".
The current RA, however, while agreeable to having the SC validate the bills, thinks that the SC shouldn't have anything to say on the matter of the Constitution. The major reasoning behind this is that the SC can effectively be a "blocker of change" (when change needs to occur for the best of Neualtenburg), by systematically rejecting all bills that move the city towards its future, and preventing any Constitutional changes that would relieve the SC's of most of it "blocking" power. Effectively, this model of government would be deemed ultra-conservative or even slightly corporativistic, where one of the branches (a non-elected one) is able to keep the "status quo", although the whole citizens may have voted for a change.
Now, obviously, removing the SC veto on the constitutional amendments is not a solution; the same arguments for "a tiny group being able to change the way Neualtenburg according to their wishes" would effectively apply again, but this time to the RA: in the current case, 4 people, agreeing together, could effectively wipe out all the other branches, get rid of the checks and controls, and change the requirements for elections.
Thus, a suggestion was made, which is a reasonable compromise: institute a referendum (instead of a vote of approval by the SC) for validation of Constitutional changes. That way, the RA would propose the changes, the SC would give their opinion, but it would be a citizen's vote to ratify the amendment.
There are naturally pros and cons of this approach, but, as suggested on the RA, an elected government should never fear the citizen's vote. However, the referendum, as an institution, does not exist on the constitution; it needs an amendment to introduce it (an amendment which obviously will be done using the current system); and, like any other things on the constitution, it also needs a degree of checks and balances to keep it from being abused.
I think it's needless to say that a governmental system that relies constantly upon the "public vote" to work is a base democracy, not a representative one; and that only works for the Swiss, for philosophical reasons I would certainly be glad to discuss and explain in-world (I've done one or two events on it

Thus, what I would suggest is that the RA approves a constitutional amendment that introduces the referendum, and rewrites the veto powers of SC and Guild, under terms eventually similar to the following:
- The SC is not entitled to a veto on constitutional matters (it will only pronounce the validity of the proposed amendments, but will not be able to veto them)
- For the sake of clarity, all references to "rewriting and resubmitting" bills should be deleted on the Constitution; the veto is just that, a veto (ie. "this bill shall not pass!"
, nothing else
- Bills will be automatically approved after a certain time has elapsed, and a veto by either the Guild (budget issues) or the SC (all other issues) should be followed by a detailed explanation on why the veto was exercized (thus, the RA, or any other citizen really, is able to use that explanation to rewrite the wording of the bill and resubmit it as they see fit).
- Neualtenburg is not a "bicameral government" and the SC/Guild do not work as a legislative body, or "helpers" of the legislative process — the RA is fully autonomous in that respect, and does not require to consult either the SC or the Guild on bill-passing issues.
- Neualtenburg is not a "bicameral government" and the SC/Guild do not work as a legislative body, or "helpers" of the legislative process — the RA is fully autonomous in that respect, and does not require to consult either the SC or the Guild on bill-passing issues.
- The referendum
- The referendum is called by suggestion of the RA or by a petition by 10% of the population
- It can be called only once per term of office, or six months, whatever is shorter
- The same issue cannot be validated through referendum twice in a row, ie. there must be an interval of at least one term of office, or six months, whatever is shorter, until the same issue can be subjected to a referendum again
- The SC will require that the referendum, to have enforcing power, has at least 50% (+ 1) people voting, and, of those, at least 50% (+1) people vote "aye" (basically, this means "simple majority"
. That's the minimum requirement at this point; the RA, however, is able to set more stricter voting requirements if they wish (see the latest transcript, many alternatives were suggested, all of them 'stronger' requirements than this one)
- Currently, a referendum will be introduced to validate constitutional amendments (called by the RA), with ultimate powers (ie. the people's decision cannot be overriden by any veto). Eventually the referendum could also be used as an 'advisory' on certain issues that the RA wish to clarify or give a strong emphasis before submitting a bill(examples: moving N'burg back into the mainland, institute a model of taxation, or other issues that do not require a constitutional amendment, but that the RA 'feels' the whole population should have something to say about it). This would also mean that a Guild's or SC's veto contrary to "the people's will" will, very likely, be used as a basis for a resignation notice, or, eventually, impeachment (ie. an SC/Guild working contrary to the people's will is almost certainly undesirable). This is also the reason for the limitations on the number of referendums that can/shall be held per term, and the number of times the same issue can be raised.
- The referendum is called by suggestion of the RA or by a petition by 10% of the population
This is now officially open for discussion, although I should remind you that, at this moment, it only requires a simple constitutional amendment to introduce the referendum and the change to the "balance of powers"
