Raw: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05956.pdf
(1) some electronic voting systems did not encrypt cast ballots or system audit logs, and it was possible to alter both without being detected.
(2) it was possible to alter the files that define how a ballot looks and works so that the votes for one candidate could be recorded for a different candidate; and
(3) vendors installed uncertified versions of voting system software at the local level.
Spun: http://www.freepress.org/departments/display/19/2005/1529
The GAO also confirms that access to the voting network was easily compromised because not all digital recording electronic voting systems (DREs) had supervisory functions password-protected, so access to one machine provided access to the whole network. This critical finding confirms that rigging the 2004 vote did not require a "widespread conspiracy" but rather the cooperation of a very small number of operatives with the power to tap into the networked machines and thus change large numbers of votes at will. With 800,000 votes cast on electronic machines in Ohio, flipping the number needed to give Bush 118,775 could be easily done by just one programmer.
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